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Case File · Project Marvel · Aug. 2026 Issue

The Ethical
Wall

(that's not our line. it's the city's own finance chief, on the record)

San Antonio's "independent" economic study on the Spurs arena traces back to the Spurs' own ownership group in four passes, a give-and-go the stadium-subsidy industry has been running for twenty years.

This isn't a news article. It's a case file, built from public budget records, council minutes and reporting, then argued from start to finish. The receipts are all linked at the bottom; the argument stands or falls on them.

Every team has a lead. Every city has a foundation. This is a record of what happens when something bigger decides how long it's willing to wait for one to give.

Before the opening credits

The City Was Here Before the Team

This place was here before the Spurs were a good team, before the Spurs were a team at all. People had been living along this river for thousands of years before any Spanish flag reached it. Payaya bands drew water from the springs the colonizers would later rename San Pedro. The river had already been doing its job for centuries by the time anyone thought to write a charter.

None of that appears in an arena pitch deck. It doesn't have to. Not until someone puts it there.

In 2021, the investment firm Sixth Street bought roughly a fifth of the San Antonio Spurs at a valuation north of $1.8 billion. It's the same capital that has been buying into franchises across nearly every major league. Private money already has a seat at the table for decisions about this city. This just bought it more leverage.

It doesn't matter whether the people negotiating these deals believe the case they're making or simply know no one will check their math. Either way, going against the Spurs in public gets painted as going against the city itself. It isn't. The city was here before the team, and it'll be here long after this ownership group is gone. That's what this case file is for.

The mission

Make it cost them enough to raise the baseline, not just the skyline.

Roll the freeze frame

These Are the Players

Every heist movie stops to introduce its crew before the job starts. Same rules here: five names, one loop, and a vote that waved it all through.

REC 01 00:00:04:12
The Home Team
SAN ANTONIO SPURS
Ownership group, incl. Michael Dell
Wants $489M in public money for the arena. Every other name on this strip traces back to them.
REC 02 00:00:07:19
The Ringer
DAVID STONE
Stone Planning LLC · Spurs' own consultant
Wrote the first 29-page arena analysis for the team he works for, not the city.
REC 03 00:00:11:03
The "Independent" One
CSL INTERNATIONAL
City's hired analyst · $330,665 contract
Four passes from Spurs ownership. Called the numbers feasible anyway.
REC 04 00:00:13:21
The Owner's Owner
LEGENDS / SIXTH STREET
Hospitality mgmt. · bought CSL in 2011
Sixth Street Partners became a Spurs strategic partner in 2021, closing the loop.
REC 05 00:00:19:08
Waved It Through
THE COUNCIL MAJORITY
7 of 11 votes · Aug. 21, 2025
Voted down the independent study. “You either trust this team… or you don't.” (Phyllis Viagran, D3)

Personnel: who's guarding whom

The Loop

The firm the city hired to check the Spurs' numbers isn't outside the Spurs' financial orbit. It's four passes from the ownership group itself, and the ball never really leaves Spurs hands. The city's own finance chief confirmed the chain on the record, then called it a wash.

  1. 1
    Team owner

    The Spurs

    Own the team asking San Antonio for $489 million.

  2. 2
    Their consultant

    David Stone

    Hired directly by the Spurs. Writes the 29-page analysis backing that number.

  3. 3
    The city's auditor

    CSL International

    Hired by the city to independently check the math. Leans on figures that trace back to Stone's own report.

  4. 4
    The Spurs' partner

    Legends

    Bought CSL in 2011. Has been the Spurs' own strategic partner since 2021.

↩ which loops back to no. 1

The firm checking the Spurs' own numbers is one hop from a company that's been the Spurs' own strategic partner since 2021.

The city's finance chief called that “kind of an ethical wall.” Kind of.

Team owner
San Antonio Spurs
Ownership group, incl. Michael Dell.
the team asking for $489M
Their consultant
David Stone
Stone Planning LLC · Spurs' own consultant · 29-pg. arena analysis.
literally works for the Spurs, lol
The city's auditor
CSL International
City's hired “independent” analyst · $330,665 contract on the district study.
the “neutral” one, allegedly
The Spurs' partner
Legends
Hospitality Mgmt. · maj. investor: Sixth Street Partners.
plot twist: also Spurs money
“There is kind of an ethical wall between the work that CSL does and the ownership group.”
Ben Gorzell Chief of Financial & Administrative Services, City of San Antonio · Aug. 6, 2025

The shot clock

Fifteen Days

From the day the city's own numbers guy conceded the conflict to the day council voted on whether to check it independently: two weeks and a day.

JUL 2024
David Stone begins the Spurs-commissioned arena analysis.
AUG 6, 2025
Gorzell discloses the CSL, Legends, and Sixth Street tie; CSL's own staff admit relying on Stone's data.
AUG 11
Mayor Jones publicly demands a truly independent analysis.
AUG 15
KSAT Investigates breaks the CSL business-ties story.
AUG 21
Term sheet passes 7–4. Independent-study requirement fails 4–7, same session.
OCT 1
KSAT: the $330,665 report the city got instead is called "useless" by outside experts.

Aug. 21, 2025 · Item 4

The Box Score

RESOLUTION: AGENDA ITEM 4 “...the City Council will not consider a proposed Terms Sheet with the San Antonio Spurs for a proposed arena downtown until a) the City Council receives an independent economic impact study...” and b) each council member holds constituent engagement sessions on the findings.

Voted to require it

4
  • Gina Ortiz Jones MAYOR
    “Due diligence is not anti-progress, it is anti-poverty.”
  • Teri Castillo D5
    “There will be indirect displacement.”
  • Ric Galvan D6
  • Leo Castillo-Anguiano D2 (interim)
    “The folks asking us to vote yes were wearing fancy business suits.”

Voted to skip it

7
  • Phyllis Viagran D3
    “You either trust this team… or you don't.”
  • Edward Mungia D4
    “We still have the ability to get out of this deal.”
  • Sukh Kaur D1
  • Marina Aldrete Gavito D7
  • Ivalis Meza Gonzalez D8
  • Misty Spears D9
    “We can still… get economic analysis, even after we proceed.”
  • Marc Whyte D10
    “Everybody deserves a voice. But we've got to come together.”

7 beats 4. no coach's challenge undoes this one.

Tendencies

The Scouting Report

CSL International didn't invent this play in San Antonio. Here's the same firm's shot chart in four other cities, and where San Antonio's own number sits, still unresolved. Filter the cards, or scroll to the full table below.

Missed by 82 pts
Philadelphia
Convention Ctr. expansion · 2003
Projected+56% hotel stays
Actual−26%
Missed by 126 pts
Washington, D.C.
Convention Ctr. expansion · 2003
Projected+103% hotel stays
Actual−23%
Expenses ran 3.03× over
Brooklyn
Barclays Center · 2009
Projected$24.6M expenses
Actual$74.5M
Retracted in a week
Washington, D.C.
D.C. United stadium · 2014
Claimed$109.4M profit
Real new revenue$38.0M
Called "feasible" anyway
Louisville
Louisville City FC · 2016
20-yr return$2.7M
Public cost$30–50M
Pending
San Antonio
Project Marvel arena · 2025
Claimed$18B / 30 yrs
Statusdue 2032–33

Full sourced figures below ↓

Projections CSL International supplied to public bodies, vs. what happened next.
City / Project Year What was promised What was delivered
Philadelphia
Convention Ctr. expansion
2003 +56% annual hotel stays Cratered −26%the year CSL projected +56% growth
Washington, D.C.
Convention Ctr. expansion
2003 +103% annual hotel stays Cratered −23%the year CSL projected +103% growth
Brooklyn
Barclays Center
2009 $76.7M first-yr. net income; DSCR 2.82, secured investment-grade bond ratings 3× over budgetDSCR fell to 1.61, then 1.29; net income "far below" forecast
Washington, D.C.
D.C. United stadium
2014 $109.4M profit on $181.5M public investment Retracted in a week2/3 of the "profit" was land sales, not new revenue
Louisville
Louisville City FC stadium
2016 $2.7M net new tax revenue over 20 yrs on a $30–50M project Sent it anywayCSL's own numbers said $2.7M over 20 years; greenlit as "feasible" anyway
Philadelphia
76Place arena
2024 Market supports 2 arenas; 53 extra annual events, incl. 35 concerts "Completely useless"ignored 2 closed comparable arenas & a renovation-depressed baseline
San Antonio
Project Marvel arena pending
2025 $500M/yr in spending, tax revenue & jobs; $18B in economic activity over 30 yrs TBDarena not due until the 2032–33 season

Promised vs. delivered

The Receipts

Four of the cases from the scouting report, isolated to the number that mattered. Full sourced figures for each are in the table above. This is what those figures look like next to each other.

What was promised What was delivered ← blue = what they said. red = what happened.
0% PHILADELPHIA · 82-PT MISS +56% −26% WASHINGTON, D.C. · 126-PT MISS +103% −23%
CSL's 2003 forecasts for annual hotel-stay growth from two convention center expansions, vs. what the hotels actually reported. The line is the miss.
2.82 PROJECTED 1.61 YEAR 1 1.29 YEAR 2
Barclays Center's debt service coverage ratio: projected at bond issuance, then as reported in CSL's own 2016 refinancing filing.
PROJ. $24.6M ACTUAL $74.5M
Barclays Center first full-year operating expenses: projected vs. actual. Revenue that year actually beat projection; expenses ran 3× over it.
CLAIMED TOTAL: $109.4M PROFIT just... selling dirt, basically
$71.4M: land sales, not new revenue $38.0M: real new revenue
CSL retracted the $109.4M figure a week after publishing it once this split became public.
$2.7M 20-year wait for THIS? $30–50M cost
Louisville City FC stadium: CSL's own projected 20-year return on the public share of a $30–50M build: about 5–9% of the cost, recovered a two-decade wait. CSL called the project "feasible" anyway.

Built to freeze on

The Freeze Frame

One number each, for the cut-ins. Scroll the strip. Every card stands alone.

3.03×
Barclays Center's actual first-year expenses vs. what CSL projected, even though revenue beat the forecast.
Brooklyn · 2009–2016
65%
of D.C. United's claimed $109.4M arena "profit" was land sales, not new economic activity.
Washington, D.C. · 2014
126 PTS
The swing between projected and actual hotel-stay growth: +103% promised, −23% delivered.
Washington, D.C. · 2003
9%
CSL's own 20-year return projection, against the public cost of the stadium it was used to justify.
Louisville · 2016
5 CITIES
Same firm, same pattern, back to 2003. All before San Antonio signed anything.
Philly · DC · Bklyn · Louisville · SA

Why it works

The Live Look-In

These studies function as cover for team owners and elected officials who want a 400-page rationale for what they were hoping to do in the first place.

Neil deMause Editor, Field of Schemes

That's the actual answer to "why does it have to be this way": the study was never the input. It's the receipt. And the play isn't retired. It's running in another city as this page loads.

● Live · Kansas City, MO · Aug 2026

Same week you're reading this, Kansas City is running the identical play on a $600M city subsidy inside a $1.9B Royals stadium. TIF boundaries undisclosed. Agreements landed in council members' inboxes less than 12 hours before the Aug. 11, 2026 committee vote, ahead of an Aug. 31 legal deadline.

“The whole point of rushing these agreements is to ensure that they're finalized… prior to a vote of the people.”
Johnathan Duncan Councilman, Kansas City
“The city does not have a deadline or a timeline.”
Quinton Lucas Mayor, Kansas City · same week, contradicted by council's own briefing emails on the Aug. 31 deadline

The honest complication: even a hard legal backstop doesn't reliably hold. Minneapolis's city charter required a public referendum before spending on a stadium. In January 2012, council members Lisa Goodman and Sandra Colvin Roy refused to waive it, citing constituent calls running 10-to-1 against and a public already distrustful of institutions. Four months later, the state legislature passed the $1.1 billion Vikings stadium subsidy anyway, through a route that didn't touch the charter. The referendum never happened.

Where this pattern started

Exhibit A: HemisFair Arena

The Alamodome wasn't even the first building this city handed the team. Built for San Antonio's own World's Fair in 1968, HemisFair Arena sat waiting for exactly as long as it took the city's newest pro team to notice it. The Spurs played their first game there Oct. 10, 1973, and stayed twenty years, by most accounts one of the loudest buildings in the NBA by the time they left it.

They played their last game at HemisFair in May 1993, a Western Conference semifinal loss to Phoenix, then moved into the brand-new Alamodome. The city didn't keep the old building around as a backup or a practice gym. Two years later, in 1995, it tore HemisFair down to make room for an expansion of the convention center next door.

That's the version of this story where the city actually lets a building go once its job is done. The next one is the version where it doesn't.

1968
BUILT FOR THE HEMISFAIR WORLD'S FAIR
20 YEARS
SPURS' HOME · 1973 TO 1993
1995
TORN DOWN, TWO YEARS AFTER THE TEAM LEFT

Already in the budget

Exhibit B: The Alamodome

Same pattern, next building. You don't have to leave San Antonio for this, or even leave the last thirty years. The same council that voted down an independent study of the arena deal has been managing this dome the whole time. The city already owns the receipts.

“It's like buying a car with cash.”
Alex Briseño San Antonio City Manager, at the Alamodome's opening · May 1993

Thirty-three years, promise to receipt

JAN 1989
Voters approve a half-cent VIA sales tax to build it, 53% in favor.
MAY 1993
Opens on budget. City Manager Alex Briseño: “It's like buying a car with cash.”
2002
The Spurs leave for a new downtown arena. The dome starts bleeding money: a streak that won't break for 21 years.
2005
Katrina exiles the Saints here for three games. The city courts them to stay for good. By the next season, they're back in New Orleans.
2014
Raiders owner Mark Davis meets with the mayor about relocating here. Las Vegas offers more. Talks stall.
2023
First operating profit since the Spurs left. Same year, the city touts a $4B lifetime-impact number, a third of it multiplier math nobody actually counted.
$186M
PUBLIC MONEY TO BUILD IT · 1993
$109M
MORE COMMITTED SINCE · UPGRADES THROUGH 2028
SINCE 2002
RUNNING AN OPERATING DEFICIT, HOTEL-TAX SUBSIDIZED

What the $4B is actually made of

$2.7B: direct visitor spending (68%) Real dollars: lodging, food, tickets, rental cars, tracked spending. $1.3B: modeled multiplier (32%) Indirect & induced re-spending: estimated, not counted. guess how many times a dollar re-spends, then call the guess money made.

It's a real technique, and also exactly why nobody outside the field can check the homework.

$628M
Tax revenue claimed (city, county, state & federal combined)
33,000
Jobs cited: unclear if annual or cumulative job-years
~34M
Total attendees claimed over the full 30 years
$46.8M
Average annual labor income claimed

Four more numbers from the same study, not shown to be part of the $4B above. The full report was never made public.

the city paid a St. Mary's economist to tally this in 2023, for the dome's 30th birthday. $2.7B of it is real visitor spending, the rest is multiplier math nobody actually collected.

The pitch vs. the delivery

The pitchA dome that lands San Antonio an NFL franchise.
The deliveryNever happened. A one-season CFL team, the Texans, folded in ’96. The Saints borrowed the building for three games in ’05 and went home. The Raiders looked in 2014 and picked Las Vegas.
Never
The pitch“It's like buying a car with cash.” (Alex Briseño, 1993)
The deliveryTwenty-one straight years of operating deficits once the Spurs left in 2002, covered by hotel tax. First profit: 2023.
Broken
The pitchA home for the NCAA Men's Final Four.
The deliveryDelivered, five times over: 1998, 2004, 2008, 2018, 2025. More than any other venue has hosted.
Kept
The pitchThe $186M build cost, paid back many times over.
The deliveryA 2013 claim that four Final Fours alone recouped it was publicly disputed as unverified at the time. The city's real answer, a decade later, is the $4B figure above, a third of it modeled, not counted.
Disputed

What that looks like year to year, where the city's own budget disclosures give real numbers: mostly red, with one recent exception, and a four-year stretch the city hasn't shown its work on at all.

Loss (hotel-tax subsidized) Profit
BREAK-EVEN FY19–FY22 NOT DISCLOSED −$1.20M FY2016 −$0.45M FY2017 −$2.5M FY2018 +$1.6M FY2023 first profit since 2002
Alamodome annual operating result by fiscal year. Exact figures: −$1,203,662 (FY2016), −$446,645 (FY2017), roughly −$2.5M (FY2018). The city hasn't released FY2019–FY2022 individually, then confirms FY2023 as the first profitable year since 2002, on revenue nearly double what it ran pre-pandemic. Source: San Antonio Report, city budget disclosures.
Where the real money went

The $109M is the easy stuff: eighteen new suites, elevators and escalators, restroom renovations, a roof patch scheduled for 2028, a scoreboard six years old getting swapped anyway, most of it tied to hosting the 2025 Men's Final Four, funded through hotel-tax revenue and revenue-backed certificates, not new taxes anyone voted on.

The renovation that would actually matter is a different number entirely. The city's own CFO, Ben Gorzell, has told council a comprehensive Alamodome overhaul now runs north of a billion dollars, and it's been pushed out to roughly 2035, safely behind the new Spurs arena in the funding line. There was already a revenue stream earmarked to help pay for it: a state Project Finance Zone the city set up around the Alamodome and convention center in 2023, projected to capture $222M in tax revenue over 30 years. By 2026, that money had reportedly been redirected toward the new arena district instead.

built the fund for the dome. spent it on the arena.

UTSA football has played there since the program's 2011 debut, on a lease the city extended through 2035. There's no official plan to replace it. The idea surfaced once, in a 2020 UTSA student newspaper op-ed calling for an on-campus stadium, and the same columnist reversed himself a year later, arguing UTSA should stay put. Nobody's asked since.

A proposal, not a plan

Here's one this file will float, since nobody in office has. And to be clear, this isn't a campus consensus, just an idea: stop treating an aging, already-subsidized dome as a sunk cost you keep feeding on the promise it'll eventually pay off, and start treating it as a site. Once the obligations already on the books are met and the dome has earned out what it owes, tear it down and build UTSA a stadium it owns outright.

And require the Spurs, who spent three decades in a building the city built and financed, to help fund whatever replaces it for UTSA, as a term of any new arena deal, not a favor offered after the fact.

The Alamodome's own founding logic, in 1993, was build it and they will come: a dome big enough that the NFL would finally notice. The pitch-vs-delivery list above says how that went: never. Try the opposite bet this time. Don't build something hoping a league notices. Build it because it's owed: a program that fills the dome every fall finally getting a stadium that's actually its own. If this city ever really wants to be an NFL city, that argument does more work than another speculative venue ever did.

Same city, different fight

Exhibit C: The Rodeo Grounds

Cross town, a second venue is going through its own version of this, one that traces back to the same Aug. 21, 2025 vote this file started with. Freeman Coliseum and what's now Frost Bank Center, on the East Side, have hosted the Spurs and the San Antonio Stock Show & Rodeo together since 2002. Project Marvel sends the Spurs downtown, which leaves the Rodeo as the site's main act, right as the city and county start deciding what that site becomes next.

“Fundamentally incompatible” with rodeo operations: a plan that “chokes us out” of room to grow.
Cody Davenport CEO, San Antonio Stock Show & Rodeo · on Bexar County's redevelopment plan, May 2026
$192M
PROP A: RODEO GROUNDS EXPANSION · APPROVED NOV. 4, 2025
SAME BALLOT
AS PROP B, THE ARENA'S OWN FUNDING MEASURE
9 MONTHS
FROM VOTER APPROVAL TO A COUNTY JUDGE TAKING OVER THE TALKS
SOLE TENANT
WHAT THE RODEO BECOMES ONCE THE SPURS MOVE DOWNTOWN

The money passed. What it actually buys is still being negotiated, and not with the people who use the site.

AUG 21, 2025
City council's term-sheet vote sets up the November bond package: Prop A and Prop B together.
NOV 4, 2025
Bexar County voters approve both: $192M for the rodeo grounds, and the arena's own funding measure.
MAY 2026
Davenport goes public: the county is negotiating a competing "alternate vision" for the site with private developers, rodeo leadership not at the table.
AUG 5, 2026
Talks stalled, commissioners hand negotiations to County Judge Peter Sakai to resolve directly.

The county commissioners aren't even agreed on what they're negotiating toward. Grant Moody has pushed a "rodeo first" approach; Tommy Calvert has pushed "community first," pointing to the East Side's history of getting little from the site since the arena first opened there in 2002. Davenport's own objection is operational, not political: the rodeo needs "wide, uninterrupted access routes" and "dedicated staging areas for 18-wheel livestock trailers" that a mixed-use development plan doesn't leave room for.

they're not bad at their jobs. their job was never to protect the rodeo.

the money clears the ballot. who it's actually for is still up for negotiation.

This one isn't on the city's ledger, and it isn't the Aug. 21 vote. Different government, different venue, a livestock show instead of a basketball team. But it's the same shape this whole file keeps finding, and the honest version of it isn't about competence. The developers are good at what they do: building things that pencil out for them. That was never going to include protecting a use case that doesn't. Recognizing that, and saying no on the public's behalf anyway, was supposed to be somebody else's job: the people who got elected to do it. Seven votes, four votes. A term sheet that passed and a study that didn't. A fund built for one thing, spent on another. Every exhibit in this file is the same failure in a different building: not bad actors doing what they're good at, but the people with the power to say no, not saying it.

Film room verdict

The Consensus

Decades of academic research show that the net economic impact of sports teams and stadiums on local economies is effectively zero.

Brandli Stitzel Economist, West Texas A&M · testimony to San Antonio City Council, Aug. 6, 2025

It tracks with the peer-reviewed literature going back two decades: Coates & Humphreys, Zimbalist, and a 2023 survey by Bradbury, Coates & Humphreys all land in the same place: stadium subsidies relocate spending, they don't create it.

June 10, 2026: Game 4, at Madison Square Garden

The Collapse

Gutted At The Garden

Ten months after this vote, San Antonio finally got back to the Finals, first time since 2014. They led in every single game against New York. They won one.

Game 4 is the one that explains the other four. A 27-point lead at halftime, the largest the Spurs have ever taken into a Finals half. By the final buzzer they were down one. Nobody outplayed San Antonio for three quarters. New York just kept coming, possession after possession, until the margin was gone.

TIED +19 Q1 END +27 HALFTIME +15 Q3 END −1 FINAL 27 points. gone.
Spurs scoring margin, Game 4 of the 2026 NBA Finals: a 28-point swing in the fourth quarter alone, the largest blown lead in NBA Finals history.
28
points, gone in one quarter: the largest blown lead in NBA Finals history. Nobody had ever seen a lead that size disappear that fast, on this stage, until San Antonio did it to itself.

That's the shape of this whole file, if you squint. But read it right. San Antonio didn't lose Game 4 because New York had more talent, or because some opponent was simply too tireless to beat. Twenty-eight points don't vanish in one quarter because the other team got better. They vanish because the locker-room culture that's supposed to keep five guys locked in for 48 minutes wasn't there when it mattered: effort drifting, focus gone, playing like a 27-point lead would hold itself. That's not a talent problem. It's a discipline problem. And it's the same one this whole file keeps finding: not a city outmatched by a smarter opponent, but a city whose institutions weren't disciplined enough to hold a lead they already had.

The Spurs have from October to figure out how to keep a team locked in for 48 straight minutes. San Antonio has considerably less time to figure out how to keep its own leaders locked in for the fourth quarter of this deal.

spurs the team blew a 28-point lead by accident. spurs the business hasn't blown anything. it's been running its play right on schedule the whole time.

But a defense doesn't fail because the other team is better. It fails possession by possession, when the people on the floor stop contesting the ones that still matter. Every exhibit in this file is a possession San Antonio's elected officials could have contested and didn't: the independent study, the term sheet, the fund built for one dome and spent on an arena, the grounds the Rodeo is now negotiating for without a seat at the table. The clock's still running on all of it.

Give the one official who called this early her due. Mayor Jones demanded a truly independent study before Gorzell's conflict was even public, then voted to require one when it reached the floor, and lost, 4–7. Her follow-up bid to simply delay the talks got rejected too, by city staff and the council majority alike. That's not a case of someone not fighting hard enough. It's a demonstration that this fight, played on these terms, isn't winnable: four votes on a good day, against a term sheet the other side wrote. You don't close that gap by asking louder for the next study. You close it by changing what's actually up for a vote: equity, revenue share, leverage that doesn't evaporate the moment the gavel comes down. Until that changes, San Antonio can keep contesting these possessions one at a time and keep losing them the same way: in the fourth quarter, when it counts.

If this ran like any other industry

Nothing In Writing

Every deal in this file has a number attached, and every number has a story about how the public got there. Line the three big ones up side by side and a pattern shows: the money moves first. The paperwork that would actually hold anyone to it never quite arrives.

$686M
COMBINED PUBLIC MONEY ACROSS THE THREE DEALS BELOW
$489M
ARENA CONTRIBUTION, RUNNING ON A TERM SHEET THE CITY ITSELF CALLS NON-BINDING
$192M
RODEO GROUNDS BOND: VOTERS APPROVED THE MONEY, NOT THE SITE PLAN IT'S BUYING
0
OF THE THREE BACKED BY A CONTRACT ANYONE COULD ENFORCE

The deal vs. the paperwork

The deal$489M city contribution to the arena, framework approved 7–4, Aug. 21, 2025.
The paperworkA term sheet. The city's own reporting calls it non-binding on the record. Mayor Jones's bid to require an independent study first lost, 4–7; her later bid to just delay the talks lost too.
Non-binding
The deal$192M bond for the Rodeo Grounds expansion, approved by Bexar County voters, Nov. 4, 2025.
The paperworkThe money is real and appropriated. The plan for the site it's meant to fund isn't: the county negotiated an "alternate vision" with private developers for months without rodeo leadership in the room, until talks stalled and commissioners handed it to County Judge Peter Sakai to sort out directly.
Bond signed, plan isn't
The deal$5M in state funding promised toward the Broadway corridor project.
The paperworkNever a contract, just a line in the project's public accounting. TxDOT reclaimed the street in 2023 and let the promise go quiet. Nobody in office has asked, on the record, for it in writing.
Never formalized

commissioners grant moody and tommy calvert don't even agree on what the rodeo grounds site should become. neither's asked for that disagreement in writing before the money moved.

None of this is illegal. A term sheet is a real document to sign, and a voter-approved bond is real, appropriated money. But "non-binding" is a term of art for a reason: it's the industry's own word for a commitment nobody can be sued over if it doesn't hold. Run that pattern through three deals and $686M, and it stops looking like caution. It starts looking like the plan.

a term sheet isn't a contract. it's just a handshake with better lighting.

One ask

Here's the standard this file is holding everyone to, since nobody in office has adopted it: any public commitment above $50M, city or county, gets a signed, enforceable agreement before the vote that approves the money, not sometime after, if ever. Mayor Jones, City Council, and Bexar County's Commissioners Court all turn over on their own election calendars, well before an arena breaks ground or a Rodeo Grounds plan gets finished. In private industry, nobody wires $686M against a term sheet and a verbal understanding. Here, that's just how it's done.

Roll credits

The Full Cast

Every name in this file, in the order they'd scroll if this were the last reel. Eleven votes, four hired hands, and the experts who've seen this movie before.

The Loop

Ownership groupSan Antonio Spurs
Spurs' own consultantDavid Stone
City's "independent" analystCSL International
CSL's parent, since 2011Legends / Sixth Street

City Council: voted to require the study (4)

MayorGina Ortiz Jones
D5Teri Castillo
D6Ric Galvan
D2 (interim)Leo Castillo-Anguiano

City Council: voted to skip it (7)

D3Phyllis Viagran
D4Edward Mungia
D1Sukh Kaur
D7Marina Aldrete Gavito
D8Ivalis Meza Gonzalez
D9Misty Spears
D10Marc Whyte

City staff

Chief of Financial & Administrative ServicesBen Gorzell

Expert testimony

Economist, West Texas A&MBrandli Stitzel
Editor, Field of SchemesNeil deMause

Also appearing: Kansas City, live

CouncilmanJohnathan Duncan
MayorQuinton Lucas

Also appearing: Minneapolis, 2012

City CouncilLisa Goodman
City CouncilSandra Colvin Roy

Post-credits scene · Aug. 17, 2026

One More Vote

Ten days before this file was finished, the same council was asked a smaller, more direct version of the Aug. 21 question: not whether to study the deal, but whether to let San Antonio's own voters decide on the city's $489M share of it, on the Nov. 3 ballot. It said no. 5–6.

5–6
the vote to put the city's own $489M arena contribution on the ballot: rejected, Aug. 17, 2026. Mayor Jones and four council members voted to let voters decide. Six voted no.

Some of the names on that vote aren't the same eleven this file opened with. Council turns over, seats change hands. The math didn't. A year and four days after the first vote this file is built on, the same body was handed a cleaner, more direct chance to put the money in front of the people it belongs to, and passed on it again.

this file's last word, above, was "the clock's still running." it still is. it just ran out on the ballot option while this was being written.

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